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Abstract: The corporate tax rate and regime are policy instruments that are the subject of 
considerable attention for the role they play in attracting foreign multinationals making location 
decisions across countries. This paper examines the effects of corporate tax on these location 
decisions of newly established multinational subsidiaries across 26 European countries over an eight 
year period.  We contribute to the existing literature by examining the effects of a non-linear 
response of firm location decisions to changes in the tax rate.  We find that accounting for this non-
linearity improves the performance of the model for all of the alternative measures of the tax rate.  
We also show that there are large variations in the sensitivity to tax rates across sectors and firm size 
groups.  In particular, financial sector firms are more than twice as sensitive to changes in 
corporation tax rates relative to other sectors.   
JEL Code: F23, H25, C25 
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1. Introduction 
Firms that operate in a global marketplace are faced with a variety of decisions on how to manage 
their international activities.  One of the first of these is whether to continue to use a domestic base 
and export their product or service to the foreign markets where it is demanded.  At a certain scale, 
however, it may be more efficient to set up a new affiliate abroad either to improve market access 
or to reduce the costs of production and avoid the costs associated with exporting.  Once a firm has 
decided to set up a base abroad, it then is faced with the decision of where to locate.  A wide range 
of factors are likely to impact on this decision by the firm.  As many of these factors are beyond the 
control of policy-makers, particular attention has been paid to the role of corporate tax rates as a 
potential way to increase the attractiveness of a country to businesses seeking a location for a new 
investment.    
This paper examines the effects of corporate tax on the location decisions of multinationals in 
Europe, while also accounting for other location choice variables.  This paper extends the existing 
literature on the effect of corporate taxation on location choices of multinationals in a number of 
ways. In contrast to the existing literature which assumes a linear response of firm location decisions 
to differences in the tax rate, we test for a non-linear response which implies that changes in tax 
rates at high levels of taxes have less effect.  The model is estimated with an extensive database on 
newly established firms locating across 26 countries and with ownership information identifying 
them as coming from a potential 48 source countries over the period from 2005 to 2012.  This allows 
us to examine the impact of a considerably wider range of characteristics from the source and 
potential host countries than has generally been the case in the literature. The size of our dataset 
allows us to examine differences in the effect of corporate tax rates across sub-groups of firms and 
sectors. 
We find that accounting for potential non-linearity in the tax effect improves the performance of the 
model for all of the alternative measures of the tax rate.  All specifications show a significantly 
negative effect of taxation on the probability of location choice but a positive squared term shows 
that the strength of this negative effect moderates as the tax rate increases.  In other words, 
although overall tax has the expected negative effect on location probability, the marginal effect of 
an increase is lower at higher rates of tax (and conversely a change in the tax rate will have a larger 
effect on the location probability if the rate is already low).   
Our baseline result is a finding that a one percent increase in the statutory or policy rate of 
corporation tax would lead to a reduction in the conditional location probability of 0.68 percent. 
Using the effective average tax rate (EATR), the marginal effect implies a reduction in the probability 
of 1.15 percent following a 1 percent increase in the tax rate.  These combine the direct and non-
linear elements of the estimated effects.   
Looking more deeply into how the tax system affects different types of firm, we find large variations 
in the sensitivity to tax rates across sectors.  For manufacturing firms, we find a significant negative 
coefficient combined with a smaller positive squared term, with the sizes of the effects being fairly 
close to those observed in the overall results.  For services firms the size of the effect is noticeably 
smaller than that for manufacturing, suggesting that services firms are more likely to be driven in 
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their location decisions by the need to be close to their identified customer base and this reduces 
their sensitivity to tax rates.  Financial sector firms appear to be the most sensitive to changes in 
corporation tax rates with an estimated marginal effect more than double those of the other 
sectors.  This is likely to be a reflection of the more footloose nature of these firms.  In terms of firm 
size, we find that the size of the tax elasticity increases across firm asset size groups showing that 
higher tax rates are regarded as a greater disincentive to choosing a location by larger firms.   
This paper focuses on the binary decision of where to locate a new affiliate by a multinational.  It 
contributes to a wide literature examining the effect of corporate taxation on foreign capital 
(Devereux and Griffith, 2002, 2003; Devereux and Freeman, 1995; Billington, 1999; Young, 1999) and 
work that models the location decisions of FDI firms more generally (Basile et al. 2009; Chen and 
Moore, 2010; Davies et al. 2009). These papers tend to find an inhibiting effect of tax on 
multinational entry and investment.  For example, Devereux and Griffith (1998) tested the effect of 
taxation on the location of production for a sample of US firms moving into Europe over the period 
1980 to 1994 and found a negative and significant effect of taxation on the choice between locations 
within Europe but not between Europe and non-EU destinations.   
A recent paper closely related to ours in terms of data and methodology is Barrios et al. (2012) who 
consider the effect of host and parent country taxation on the location decisions of European firms. 
They find a significant and negative effect of the effective rate as well as the host country 
corporation taxation on the probability of choosing a location. Additionally, they find an 
independent and strongly negative effect of parent country taxation on foreign subsidiary location 
decisions, suggesting both host and home country taxation are important determinants of firm 
operational choices on affiliate locations.  
We use a conditional logit model approach to model the decision being taken by a multinational 
across a range of location options.  Using this methodology to analyse the entry of Japanese firms 
into Europe, Head and Mayer (2005) estimate that a one percent rise in corporation taxation leads 
to a near 5 percent reduction in the probability that a specific region is chosen. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data used, including a discussion of the 
alternative measures available for corporate tax rates.  Section 3 describes the methodology used.  
Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data  
The data used in our analysis comes from the Bureau Van Dijk Amadeus database, supplemented 
with FAME data for Ireland and the United Kingdom. Our sample includes information on 3,238 new 
foreign affiliates across 26 countries for the period 2005-2012.  In order to focus on firms with direct 
ownership control, we restrict our sample to firms we can identify as foreign owned in which the 
owner has an ownership percentage of 50% or more.  We first describe the various tax measures 
used, then we describe in detail the sample of firms used in the analysis. 
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Tax variables 
We use a number of alternate tax variables; the Policy Rate, the Mean Effective Average Tax Rate 
(Mean EATR) and the Total Tax Rate.  We also use the EATR Crossborder as a robustness check. 
 
 Policy Rate: The statutory rate charged by the host country government on corporate profits 
earned by the subsidiary.  
 Mean EATR: This is calculated by comparing the cash-flows from a hypothetical, forward-
looking investment project in the presence and absence of taxation. It is a weighted average 
of the effective marginal tax rate and the policy rate, converging towards the policy rate for 
a highly profitable investment. We use the mean EATR as this also accounts for the 
implications of using different financing sources to fund the investment project, applying a 
weighting of 0.55 on projects financed by retained earnings, 0.1 on equity and 0.35 on debt. 
In order to accurately calculate the NPV of the investment, this measure also explicitly 
considers each country’s real interest rate, inflation rate, true economic depreciation rate, 
and the NPV of capital allowances on different asset types; industrial buildings, intangibles, 
machinery, financial, inventory1.  
 Total Tax Rate: This includes all taxes and mandatory contributions payable by businesses 
after accounting for allowable deductions and exemptions. 
 EATR Crossborder: This is calculated in a similar manner to the mean EATR except in an 
international setting. The approach considers a parent firm located and owned by 
shareholders in a home country which undertakes an investment in a host country through a 
wholly-owned subsidiary. It considers taxes levied by the host country government on 
income earned by the subsidiary and corporate taxes levied by the home country 
government on the same income and personal taxes levied by the home country 
government on the shareholders. 
 
Table 1 and Table 2 below display descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for each tax 
variable used. As can be seen the Policy Rate and Mean EATR are highly correlated. The EATR 
Crossborder has a wider range as this measure takes home country taxation into account. The main 
difference between the EATR Crossborder and the first two measures is the presence of some 
outliers in the distribution, e.g. the EATR Crossborder for an investment from France into Bulgaria 
was 52.9% in 2005. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 For a detailed example of these calculations for both measures of EATR please see “Section B – Worked Examples” of 
Spengel et al (2012) report for the EU Commission. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Tax Variables 
Variable Source N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Policy Rate KPMG 82224 0.237 0.067 0.100 0.384 
Mean EATR EU Commission  82224 0.218 0.064 0.088 0.365 
EATR Crossborder EU Commission  80430 0.247 0.068 0.075 0.532 
Total Tax Rate WDI 82224 0.457 0.116 0.214 0.768 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix for Tax Variables 
 
Policy rate Mean EATR EATR crossborder Total tax rate 
Policy Rate 1.00 
   Mean EATR 0.94 1.00 
  EATR Crossborder 0.71 0.77 1.00 
 Total Tax Rate 0.56 0.53 0.41 1.00 
 
The Total Tax Rate is correlated with the other tax variables but has a much higher mean and wider 
distribution due to the inclusion of other taxes levied. The box plot in Figure 1 graphically illustrates 
these distributions. The centre line is the median of the distribution and the upper and lower ends of 
each box represent the 75th and 25th percentiles respectively. Outliers are denoted by dots to the 
extreme end of the distribution. 
Figure 1 Box Plot of Tax Variables 
 
Source: ESRI analysis of tax data 
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Figure 2  Scatter Plot of Tax Variables 
 
Source: ESRI analysis of tax data 
 
The scatter plots in Figure 2 graphically show the relationships between each pair of tax rates. 
Interestingly the plot between the Mean EATR and the EATR Crossborder illustrates that the tax 
payable is at least the Mean EATR of the host country, but may be significantly higher, depending on 
the home country taxation rates.  
 
Firm-level Data: Descriptive Statistics 
In the following series of tables we describe host and home country coverage, sectoral and firm-level 
splits that are employed in the analysis and other country-level variables we control for. A full list of 
variables and their sources is included in Annex 1.  A wide range of European countries is included in 
our analysis as can be seen from Table 3.  
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Table 3: Number of Firms by Host Country 
Country No of Firms Country No of Firms 
Austria 101 Ireland 130 
Belgium 27 Italy 421 
Bulgaria 121 Lithuania 36 
Czech Republic 214 Latvia 42 
Germany 316 Netherlands 249 
Denmark 30 Norway 104 
Estonia 66 Poland 142 
Spain 320 Portugal 109 
Finland 40 Sweden 34 
France 213 Slovenia 23 
Greece 6 Slovakia 48 
Croatia 90 United Kingdom 342 
Hungary 14   
Total 3238 
 
We aggregate up NACE 2 digit sectors into the following broad categories: manufacturing, services, 
financial, and other (construction and utilities) as well as high-tech and low-tech2. The number of 
firms in each of these sectors is broken down in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
Table 4: Number of Firms by Sector Type 
Sector Type Number Percentage 
Manufacturing 400 12% 
Services 2,020 62% 
Financial 639 20% 
Other 179 6% 
 
Table 5: Number of Firms by Sector Skill 
Sector Skill Number Percentage 
Hi-tech 896 28% 
Low-tech 1,703 53% 
Financial 639 20% 
 
Amadeus contains Profit and Loss and Balance Sheet information on each firm in the database. 
However, this is not always very well reported and due to patchy coverage of other variables we can 
only include data on each firm’s total assets. For a set of regressions we group firms by size: Small, 
Medium and Large. This split is outlined in Table 6 below. 
                                                          
2
 The initial sector aggregation in table 4 is a Eurostat aggregation based on NACE Rev 1.1 codes. For further details see   
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an2.pdf 
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Table 6: Number of Firms by Asset Size 
Size Definition Number Percentage 
Small Total Assets less than €250k 950 29% 
Medium Total Assets greater than €250k and less than €3m 804 25% 
Large Total Assets greater than €3m 853 26% 
Unknown No Asset data 631 19% 
 
Table 7 provides information on the location of the parent company. This distribution is broadly as 
one would expect with OECD countries making up the majority of origin countries. We could only 
include firms in which the home country was known and could be traced by Bureau van Dijk in their 
ownership database.  
 
Table 7: Number of Firms by Location of Owner 
Country Number of Firms Country Number of Firms 
United States of America 478 Australia 30 
Germany 319 Korea, Republic 
of 
30 
Luxembourg 273 Ireland 29 
United Kingdom 249 Poland 27 
Netherlands 210 Slovakia 27 
Switzerland 194 Portugal 26 
France 167 Romania 26 
Sweden 146 Malta 23 
Spain 123 Czech Republic 19 
Italy 117 Turkey 19 
Cyprus 105 Hungary 18 
Belgium 93 Estonia 16 
Austria 92 Slovenia 16 
Denmark 84 Lithuania 15 
Finland 70 Latvia 15 
Japan 54 Croatia 14 
Canada 50 Greece 11 
Norway 40 Others 13 
Total 3238 
 
Our year coverage is from 2005-2012 as presented in Table 8. One might have expected a significant 
drop in the number of new affiliates being opened as a result of the financial crisis and subsequent 
recession in Europe in 2008. We can see this in the 2009 data, however this trend does not continue 
as we have a higher number of new affiliates opened in 2010 than any other year. 
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Table 8: Number of Firms by Year of Entry 
Year of Entry No of Firms 
2005 389 
2006 444 
2007 423 
2008 439 
2009 217 
2010 634 
2011 486 
2012 206 
Total 3,238 
 
Country-level Control Variables  
We use a wide range of country controls in our regressions. Our choice is informed by the literature 
on firm location decision.  To capture information on host country market potential and growth we 
use inverse distance-weighted GDP and GDP growth respectively.  The cost and quality of the labour 
force is commonly found to be a significant determinant of location choice. We include information 
on both relative labour cost and the share of the host country labour force with third level 
education.  
Other relative measures included are distance in km between home and host country capital cities, 
relative GDP per capita and relative population. In our baseline we include only the log of GDP to 
capture country size. However, in our main extended model, we replace this with the log of relative 
GDP between the home and host economies. We also conduct a robustness check to control for a 
non-linear impact of country size by including a squared term with lnGDP.  
The lag of FDI stock as a proportion of GDP within each potential host country is used to capture 
agglomeration as well as potential crowding out by existing FDI firms.  As this measure is broad it 
may also capture potential displacement effects of similar firms. By including the proportion of 
motorways as a percentage of total land area we have a broad proxy for the level of infrastructure in 
the host country.  
A range of other potential explanatory variables we include are dummy variables to indicate 
whether the host and home country share a common language, if they shared a colonial relationship 
at some stage in the past and if they share a border.  
We also include a dummy for EU15 membership. Detailed information on variable definitions and 
source data is contained in Annex 1.  Table 9 contains summary statistics and Table 10 the 
correlation matrix for all variables used in our analysis.  
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Table 9: Summary Statistics  
Variable Source N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Location AMADEUS 82224 0.039 0.194 0 1 
Market potential* WDI, CEPII 82224 23.058 0.895 20.402 24.133 
GDP growth WDI 82224 0.022 0.039 -0.180 0.122 
Labour education WDI 82224 0.266 0.075 0.115 0.415 
Relative Labour cost* AMECO 82224 -0.401 2.470 -6.995 3.421 
Agglomeration WDI 82224 0.513 0.331 0.098 2.044 
Distance* CEPII 82224 7.396 0.943 4.088 9.802 
Infrastructure 
 
82224 0.016 0.016 0 0.064 
Common language CEPII 82224 0.068 0.252 0 1 
Share border CEPII 82224 0.096 0.295 0 1 
Former colony CEPII 82224 0.044 0.205 0 1 
Natural resources WDI 82224 0.016 0.032 0 0.219 
EU 15 membership - 82224 0.530 0.499 0 1 
Relative Population* WDI 82224 0.691 2.246 -5.627 5.464 
Relative GDP PC* WDI 82224 0.579 0.863 -3.134 3.076 
* Variable in natural logarithm 
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Table 10: Correlation Matrix for Variables Included in Regressions 
 
Market 
potential 
GDP 
growth 
Labour 
education 
Relative 
Labour 
cost Agglomeration Distance Infrastructure 
Common 
language 
Share 
border 
Former 
colony 
Natural 
resources 
EU 15 
membership 
Relative 
Population 
Relative 
GDP PC 
Market 
potential 1.00 
             
GDP growth 0.03 1.00 
            
Labour 
education -0.04 -0.15 1.00 
           
Relative Labour 
cost 0.73 0.12 -0.18 1.00 
          
Agglomeration -0.01 0.01 0.39 -0.06 1.00 
         
Distance -0.80 -0.02 -0.02 -0.59 -0.10 1.00 
        
Infrastructure -0.04 -0.19 0.10 -0.14 0.35 -0.14 1.00 
       
Common 
language 0.02 -0.04 0.14 -0.05 0.20 -0.20 0.19 1.00 
      
Share border 0.14 -0.02 0.02 0.09 0.05 -0.44 0.19 0.48 1.00 
     
Former colony -0.14 -0.02 0.10 -0.16 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.26 0.16 1.00 
    
Natural 
resources 0.01 0.00 0.23 -0.05 -0.09 0.00 -0.24 -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 1.00 
   
EU 15 
membership -0.04 -0.26 0.29 -0.22 0.06 -0.02 0.48 0.24 0.16 0.09 -0.28 1.00 
  
Relative 
Population -0.47 0.01 0.12 -0.49 0.13 0.38 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.22 1.00 
 
Relative GDP 
PC 0.10 0.18 -0.34 0.27 -0.04 0.07 -0.32 -0.11 -0.13 -0.04 -0.19 -0.62 0.01 1.00 
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3. Methodological approach 
To explore the relationship between the location choice of multinationals and corporate tax rates, 
we draw on the existing literature and use a conditional logit model as in McFadden (1974). This 
model has been applied empirically in the recent literature both on the wider determinants of 
location choices of multinationals (Head and Mayer, 2005; Siedschlag et al., 2013a,b) and more 
specifically on research focusing on the effect of corporation tax on MNE location decisions 
(Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Barrios et al., 2012).  While alternative approaches such as the nested 
logit model and Poisson models can be used, the conditional logit is the most widely applied in the 
extant literature. Schmidheiny et al (2011) and Guimaraes et al. (2003; 2004) provide a useful 
discussion on the relative merits of each when modelling the firm location decision problem. 
To model the locational choice facing the enterprise, the firm’s problem can be outlined as follows. 
The profits earned from locating in a particular country,      are:  
                
Where   is a vector of location specific control variables. The firm therefore faces a choice across 
destinations which yield different potential returns. It must therefore choose the location, c, across J 
alternatives which satisfies the condition: 
                           
That is     yields the highest profit across all groups. The firm therefore makes the following 
decision:  
    
                
          
  
 
In this case Y, the dependent variable, is an indicator of the location choice of Multinational 
Enterprise (MNE) i, over a set of all possible locations J. It is a function of the location specific 
characteristics    . Assuming that the error term     is modelled as a type 1 extreme value 
distribution, IID across all firms and countries, the probability of choosing country c can be expressed 
as follows:  
 
                  
     
          
 
The coefficient vector   can be estimated using maximum likelihood methods. An important 
consideration is the selection of control variables in  . Following the existing literature, we include 
the following controls in our baseline model: market potential (distance weighted GDP), ln GDP to 
capture market size, GDP growth, host economy labour cost, the share of the population with 
tertiary education (% of labour force) to capture labour quality, the existing stock of FDI (to capture 
agglomeration and network effects), the density of motorways to capture the quality of 
infrastructure and the distance between host and home country capital cities. 
An extended, more global model includes controls for countries that share a common language, a 
common border or shared a past colonial link. A dummy for EU-15 is also included while a control for 
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the share of natural resources is also included. We also include relative GDP, population and labour 
costs. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level.  
When applying non-linear discrete choice models such as the conditional logit, a number of issues 
arise in calculating the magnitude of effects from the coefficients. Firstly, while the sign on the 
coefficient is always interpretable as the direction of the effect, the magnitude is not so easily 
interpreted as the model is non-linear and the effect is dependent on the functional form.  
Secondly, developing a single magnitude from a coefficient is non-trivial as there are a number of 
available methodologies including estimated marginal effects and probability elasticities. Greene 
(2012) notes that the selection decision between marginal effects and elasticities is mainly a matter 
of choice, as the sign and significance does not change between the effects. In essence both apply a 
different positive scaling to the estimated coefficient so no changes occur in relation to the sign of 
the effect.  
Thirdly, there is no consensus in the literature as to which effect is the “industry standard” with 
some papers reporting marginal effects (Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Barrios et al., 2012) and others 
reporting probability elasticities (Head and Mayer, 2004). Given our paper is closer to Devereux and 
Griffith (1998), we report estimated marginal effects. These are calculated as follows:   
       
  
            
Where   3 simplifies to 1/J when evaluated at the means of all covariates. In our case, J = 26 
representing the number of countries in our choice set. The marginal effects can be interpreted as 
an increase in variable X by 1 percent changes the conditional probability of locating in particular 
country by the estimated value (in percent). In section 4, we provide both the coefficients and tables 
of estimated marginal effects for our tax rates of interest.  
In estimating the marginal effects for corporate taxation, consideration must be given to the fact 
that the variable enters the estimation equation in a non-linear fashion. To estimate an overall 
marginal effect for corporation taxation, which includes both linear and non-linear terms, we follow 
Davies et al. (2001) and apply the following calculation: 
       
  
                         
Where     is the estimated coefficient on the linear term,     is the estimated coefficient on the 
non-linear term and    is the mean tax rate from the sample data.  
 
4. Empirical results 
Our first results look at the effects on multinational location decisions for the entire sample of firms, 
focusing on the effects of various estimates of the corporate tax rate faced by the firm in each 
                                                          
3
 Where Pc = P(y=c) probability the location is chosen amongst the alternatives.  
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potential country.  We then look deeper into the sensitivity of firms in different broad sectors to the 
location characteristics and to different elements of the tax structure. 
 
Baseline results 
We begin with the baseline results presented in Column 1 of Table 11, where we include the 
statutory policy rate as our measure of corporate tax.  Looking at the other country characteristics 
first, we find the expected positive effect of GDP on the probability of locating in a particular 
country, picking up the attractiveness of access to larger and higher-income markets.  In the initial 
specification, we also find a positive and significant effect of market potential. This is in line with 
expectations and captures the attractiveness of larger, closer proximity markets.  
 
Table 11: Estimates of Conditional Logit Model for Multinational Location Choice – Baseline – 
Linear Tax Rates 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
b/se b/se b/se 
Market Potential 3.114*** 3.221*** 3.170*** 
 
(0.334) (0.337) (0.330) 
Ln GDP 0.684*** 0.614*** 0.634*** 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.026) 
GDP Growth -0.628 -0.268 -0.365 
 
(0.886) (0.890) (0.890) 
Ln Labour Cost -0.271*** -0.364*** -0.341*** 
 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.044) 
Labour Quality 0.510 0.664* 0.720* 
 
(0.416) (0.403) (0.434) 
FDI Stock (% of GDP) t-1  -0.895*** -0.855*** -0.876*** 
 
(0.080) (0.078) (0.084) 
Motorway Density 4.743*** 3.277** 3.533** 
 
(1.455) (1.504) (1.513) 
Ln Distance -1.283*** -1.289*** -1.285*** 
 
(0.042) (0.041) (0.041) 
Policy rate -2.092*** 
  
 
(0.603) 
  Mean EATR 
 
0.840 
 
  
(0.701) 
 Total Tax Rate 
  
0.008 
   
(0.188) 
N 82224 82224 82224 
Pseudo R2 0.121 0.120 0.120 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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GDP growth is also insignificant in this initial specification but, as we shall see in the next table, this is 
not the case when we take into account the non-linearity of the effect of the tax rate.  We find the 
expected negative and significant effect of labour cost on the location decision: in our sample, firms 
are attracted towards lower labour cost destinations. We find some evidence that labour quality is 
positively associated with location choice but the effect is weak.  
Given that labour cost and GDP per capita are quite strongly correlated, this implies a trade-off 
facing the firm between access to high-income customers and high wage workers.  We do not 
include GDP per capita in the specification due to this extremely high correlation (      ).    
We include the lag of the stock of FDI in the economy to capture both agglomeration as well as 
potential crowding out by existing FDI firms. The literature on agglomeration effects has found 
evidence that there are benefits to firms to locating in the same regions as other similar firms in 
order to take advantage of potential spillovers and other externalities such as supplier and labour 
pools.  However, much of this research relates to regional or city level clusters and as our data is at a 
more aggregated level, it is not surprising that we do not find such an effect. This may perhaps 
indicate that there is also a competitive effect that offsets the agglomeration benefits, or, perhaps 
equally likely, that agglomeration externalities are better measured using firm counts at a regional 
level which we do not have access to. Lagged motorway density is included as a proxy to indicate 
infrastructure and public investment and has a positive and significant effect on the probability of 
location choice.   
The first tax measure we include in this baseline specification is the country’s headline policy rate for 
corporate profits.  We find a significant and negative effect of this rate on the probability of choosing 
a location.  The other columns in Table 11 examine how this result is affected by using different 
measures of the tax rate.  Column 2 uses the effective average tax rate (EATR) and column 3 shows 
the results for the total tax rate.  The other country characteristics have the same pattern as before, 
apart from labour quality which becomes statistically significant.  In contrast to the policy rate both 
the EATR and the total tax rate are not found to be statistically significant.  
The first results presented in Table 11 showed a negative relationship between the probability of 
location choice and corporate tax rates for only one specification.  Our next set of results show that 
this was almost certainly due to not taking account of non-linearity in the reaction of firms to the tax 
rate.  Table 12 uses the same set of country characteristics as the baseline regressions and the same 
set of three alternative measures of the corporate tax rate.  However, in this set of specifications, we 
include a squared term for each of the tax rates.   
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Table 12: Estimates of Conditional Logit Model for Multinational Location Choice – Baseline – 
Linear Tax Rates 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
b/se b/se b/se 
Ln GDP 0.704*** 0.732*** 0.643*** 
 
(0.029) (0.033) (0.025) 
Market Potential 3.932*** 4.674*** 3.489*** 
 
(0.364) (0.390) (0.331) 
GDP Growth 0.986 1.478 3.246*** 
 
(0.890) (0.916) (1.005) 
Ln Labour Cost -0.182*** -0.038 -0.533*** 
 
(0.047) (0.053) (0.051) 
Labour Quality 0.598 -0.428 2.763*** 
 
(0.414) (0.411) (0.502) 
FDI Stock (% of GDP) t-1  -1.154*** -1.032*** -1.082*** 
 
(0.083) (0.081) (0.085) 
Ln Distance -1.369*** -1.414*** -1.350*** 
 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.042) 
Motorway Density 6.623*** 5.887*** 7.891*** 
 
(1.508) (1.526) (1.553) 
Policy rate -21.917*** 
  
 
(2.241) 
  Policy rate 2 0.382*** 
  
 
(0.041) 
  Mean EATR 
 
-34.530*** 
 
  
(2.879) 
 Mean EATR 2 
 
0.665*** 
 
  
(0.052) 
 Total Tax Rate 
  
-14.519*** 
   
(0.942) 
Total Tax Rate 2 
  
0.148*** 
   
(0.010) 
N 82,224 82,224 82,224 
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.129 0.132 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Taking into account this non-linearity in the effect of the tax rate on firm location decisions improves 
the performance of the model for all of the alternative measures of the tax rate.  All three columns 
show a significantly negative effect of taxation on the probability of location choice.  However, the 
strength of this negative effect moderates as the tax rate increases, as shown by the positive 
squared term in all of the specifications.  In other words, although overall tax has the expected 
negative effect on location probability, the marginal effect of an increase is lower at higher rates of 
tax.   
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Table 13 examines the robustness of these results by expanding the set of country characteristics 
relative to the base specification.  The additional variables are all expected to increase the 
attractiveness of a particular location, either by capturing characteristics of the country itself that 
would make doing business there easier (such as sharing a common border or the availability of 
natural resources) or by proxying for the closeness of the relationship between countries (such as 
historical colonial links or common language).  We also include the relative population size between 
home and host economies to capture country size differentials.  
Table 13: Estimates of Conditional Logit Model for Multinational Location Choice – Baseline - Quadratic 
Tax Rates – Extended Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Ln GDP -0.494*** 0.080 0.136 
 
(0.154) (0.164) (0.160) 
Market Potential 3.401*** 3.928*** 2.707*** 
 
(0.389) (0.410) (0.366) 
GDP Growth 3.556*** 3.525*** 5.184*** 
 
(0.934) (0.962) (1.048) 
Ln Labour Cost 0.413*** 0.036 -0.597*** 
 
(0.140) (0.153) (0.145) 
Labour Quality -0.769* -1.517*** 1.823*** 
 
(0.436) (0.433) (0.509) 
FDI Stock (% of GDP) t-1  -1.004*** -0.936*** -1.008*** 
 
(0.089) (0.085) (0.088) 
Ln Distance -1.094*** -1.137*** -1.024*** 
 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.050) 
Motorway Density 8.342*** 7.779*** 10.006*** 
 
(1.666) (1.655) (1.675) 
Common Language 0.348*** 0.412*** 0.319*** 
 
(0.068) (0.070) (0.070) 
Contiguity (Common Border) 0.410*** 0.348*** 0.563*** 
 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.064) 
Colonial relationship 0.326*** 0.355*** 0.305*** 
 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.065) 
Natural resource dependence 10.075*** 8.974*** 8.665*** 
 
(1.144) (1.098) (1.167) 
Relative Population -1.156*** -0.544*** -0.383** 
 
(0.167) (0.177) (0.171) 
EU 15 0.966*** 0.844*** 0.873*** 
 
(0.121) (0.118) (0.127) 
Policy rate -18.766*** 
  
 
(2.333) 
  Policy rate
2 
 0.299*** 
  
 
(0.043) 
  Mean EATR 
 
-31.427*** 
 
  
(2.741) 
 Mean EATR
2
 
 
0.605*** 
 
  
(0.051) 
 Total Tax Rate 
  
-15.222*** 
   
(0.965) 
Total Tax Rate
2
 
  
0.154*** 
   
(0.010) 
N 82,224 82,224 82,224 
Pseudo R2 0.138 0.141 0.146 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The effects of the extended specifications are consistent regardless of the measure of the tax rate 
used.    Sharing a common official language, common border or historical colonial links all pick up the 
extent of linkages between the FDI source and potential host countries and have significantly 
positive effects on the probability of being chosen as the preferred location by the multinational.  
The extent of natural resource availability is also a feature positively associated with multinational 
entry.  Relative population carries a statistically significant and negative sign.  
Despite increasing the set of possible explanatory variables, we continue to find a significant 
negative effect of each of the tax rates on the location probability, with a small offsetting positive 
coefficient on the squared tax rate indicating a lessening of the effect at higher rates.  Finally, we 
add a number of additional relative measures to this extended model which capture the differences 
between the home and host economies. This includes relative labour cost and relative GDP.  
Combined with relative distance and relative population, these factors should capture the 
differential effect between home and host economies that bear influence on the corporate location 
strategy.  
Including these additional controls in Table 14, our main findings hold in all cases with a negative 
and significant effect of the main tax effect and a positive and significant effect of the squared term. 
We use this model as our baseline going forward when estimating differences across groups of firms, 
sectors and presenting the marginal effects.  
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Table 14: Estimates of Conditional Logit Model for Multinational Location Choice – Quadratic Tax Rates – 
Extended Main Model  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Market Potential 3.401*** 3.928*** 2.707*** 
 
(0.389) (0.410) (0.366) 
GDP Growth 3.556*** 3.525*** 5.184*** 
 
(0.934) (0.962) (1.048) 
Labour Quality -0.769* -1.517*** 1.823*** 
 
(0.436) (0.433) (0.509) 
Relative Labour Cost -0.413*** -0.036 0.597*** 
 
(0.140) (0.153) (0.145) 
FDI Stock (% of GDP) t-1  -1.004*** -0.936*** -1.008*** 
 
(0.089) (0.085) (0.088) 
Distance -1.094*** -1.137*** -1.024*** 
 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.050) 
Motorway Density 8.342*** 7.779*** 10.006*** 
 
(1.666) (1.655) (1.675) 
Common Language 0.348*** 0.412*** 0.319*** 
 
(0.068) (0.070) (0.070) 
Continguity (Common Border) 0.410*** 0.348*** 0.563*** 
 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.064) 
Colonial Relationship 0.326*** 0.355*** 0.305*** 
 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.065) 
Natural Resource Dependence 10.075*** 8.974*** 8.665*** 
 
(1.144) (1.098) (1.167) 
EU 15 0.966*** 0.844*** 0.873*** 
 
(0.121) (0.118) (0.127) 
Relative Population -0.662*** -0.624*** -0.519*** 
 
(0.035) (0.039) (0.032) 
Relative GDP 0.494*** -0.080 -0.136 
 
(0.154) (0.164) (0.160) 
Policy rate -18.766*** 
  
 
(2.333) 
  Policy rate2  0.299*** 
  
 
(0.043) 
  Mean EATR 
 
-31.427*** 
 
  
(2.741) 
 Mean EATR2 
 
0.605*** 
 
  
(0.051) 
 Total Tax Rate 
  
-15.222*** 
   
(0.965) 
Total Tax Rate2 
  
0.154*** 
   
(0.010) 
N 82,224 82,224 82,224 
Pseudo R2 0.138 0.141 0.146 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Interpretation of the coefficients of a conditional logit model can be somewhat difficult so Table 15 
makes an adjustment following Davies et al. (2001) to convert the coefficients on the tax variables 
into marginal effects.  Comparing these results to others in the literature such as Devereux and 
Griffith (1998) our baseline elasticity of 1.15 on the EATR is in line with their finding of 1.26. 
However, it should be noted that studies examining the effect of taxes on investment volumes tend 
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to result in higher elasticities, as per DeMooij (2005), but these should not be directly compared to 
the location probability results here. Additionally, as our methodology employs a non-linear term, 
this also gives rise to potential variation relative to previous research. It general, given the fact that 
the decision to invest and the volume of investment chosen are very different from a corporate 
perspective, it cannot be expected that the elasticities on the location probability (as in this paper) 
are equal to the investment volume elasticities (which are not dealt with in this paper). An 
evaluation of whether they are larger or smaller is outside the scope of this particular exercise and it 
is not clear a priori which direction the differences should be.  
 
Table 15: Marginal Effects – Baseline and Extended Models 
 
Policy rate Mean EATR Total Tax Rate 
Baseline (Linear) 
Marginal Effect  -0.07 
  Baseline (Quadratic) 
Marginal Effect -0.80 -1.26 -0.53 
Extended Main Model 
Marginal Effect -0.68 -1.15 -0.56 
Notes: Marginal effects are calculated as Davies et al. (2001).   
    
Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section we provide a further robustness checks4. For two of our tax variables, the policyrate 
and the mean EATR, we apply Extreme Bounds Analysis that was first proposed by Leamer (1983). 
Extreme Bounds Analysis tests the robustness of the parameter estimates of the key variable, in our 
case the corporation tax rate, by estimating the model under alternative exclusion restrictions on 
the set of other explanatory variables. In doing so we follow Sala-i-Martin (1997), who considers the 
distribution of all resulting estimates rather than just the upper and lower extreme bounds, and 
McAleer et al. (1985) who argue that selecting a subset of variables to be included in all models, as is 
sometimes practiced, is arbitrary. Considering the entire distribution of results on the basis of all 
possible combinations of other explanatory variables provides a strong test of the robustness of our 
results. 
In total we ran the model with 16,383 combinations of the other explanatory variables. The resulting 
distribution of the estimated coefficients for the tax variables follows a normal distribution with a 
mean coefficient on the policy rate of -7.285, and -13.478 for the Mean EATR (see Table 16). The 
95% confidence interval around the mean of the estimates is relatively small and only encompasses 
negative values. Furthermore, over 97% of the estimated parameters for EATR and 93% of the 
                                                          
4
 In addition to the robustness checks reported here we also conducted extensive robustness checks byincluding both the 
EATR cross border and the mean EATR, limiting the sample to home country firms that are in the OECD, home country 
firms that are in the EU 28, removing the US firms,  removing investment option pairs (home-host) that are never 
chosen by firms, as well as adding additional and re-specified control variables. Across all robustness checks, the effects 
of the new variables and sample splits are qualitatively the same and in all cases the signs and significance of the tax 
rate and its squared term remain unchanged although the magnitudes are slightly reduced in some of the 
specifications. 
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parameters for the policy rate are negative, with the remaining parameters coming from models 
with only one or two additional variables that are disregarded in the Sala-i-Martin paper. This 
sensitivity analysis therefore provides overwhelming evidence of the robustness of our results. 
 
Table 16: Descriptive Statistics for Distribution of Tax-rate Coefficients 
Variable Model runs Mean Std. Dev. 95% CI for mean 
Policyrate 16,383 -7.285 5.199 [-7.365, -7.205] 
Mean EATR 16,383 -13.478 7.470 [-13.592, -13.363] 
 
One concern regarding our estimation is the potential for an endogenous relationship to exist 
between the statutory tax rate, or the EATR, and the location choice of firms. If countries compete 
over tax rates, as demonstrated by Devereux et al. (2008) for both the statutory and effective 
average tax rate, perhaps countries might lower their rates in an effort to attract more firms? If this 
were the case, this reverse causality would bias our tax rate coefficients.  
This is more of a concern when considering backward-looking tax rates. As highlighted by Devereux 
and Maffini (2007), backward-looking average rates, which may depend on the level of investment 
and the capital stock, could introduce endogeneity into the regressions as high levels of investment 
could generate high allowances, reducing the tax liability in that period. 
We do not consider this an issue in our analysis as we are using forward-looking tax rates and we 
examine the extensive margin, not the intensive margin. However, as a robustness check we also 
estimate our model with the tax variables lagged by one period to further reduce the potential for 
reverse causality. In table 17 below we report results from our extended main model. We exclude 
2005 in order to base our comparison on a consistent sample, as using a lagged tax variable reduces 
our year coverage in some cases.  The table shows that the results using the lagged tax rates, while 
slightly smaller in absolute size are of the same sign and significance as those of the extended main 
model indicating that the estimates are robust. 
 
Table 17: Lagged Tax Rates 
 
Policy rate Mean EATR Total Tax Rate 
Extended Main Model (2006-2012) 
Tax coefficient -21.095*** -33.283*** -14.660*** 
Tax coefficient squared 0.310*** 0.606*** 0.148*** 
Extended Main model with Lagged Tax Variables (2006-2012) 
Tax coefficient -18.4057*** -30.430*** -15.552*** 
Tax coefficient squared 0.280*** 0.527*** 0.154*** 
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Sectoral and skill variation in tax response 
The results discussed so far have pooled all firms in the sample.  However, firms in different sectors 
may have different reaction functions to differences across many country level characteristics, 
including those relating to taxation.  The results are presented in Table 18 with the estimated 
marginal effects calculated in Table 19.  
We divide firms into four subgroups – manufacturing, services, financial firms and other sectors 
(primarily utilities and construction) – in order to examine if there are any differences in their 
sensitivity to the tax measures estimated above.  We also separately look at the effects of a high and 
low technology split in the non-financial sectors as well as at low-tech and high-tech manufacturing 
and services separately.  
The results are quite striking, with large variation in the size of the coefficients across the broad 
sectors.  For manufacturing firms, we find a pattern very similar to that of the total sample, with 
each of the tax measures having a significant negative coefficient combined with a smaller positive 
squared term.   The estimated coefficients for services firms have the expected negative sign and are 
statistically significant but the size of the effect is smaller than that for manufacturing.  We interpret 
this as suggesting that services firms are more likely to be driven in their location decisions by the 
need to be close to their identified customer base and this reduces their sensitivity to tax rates.  A 
similar explanation would also apply to the generally insignificant response to tax rates for the group 
of other sectors as utilities and construction would be particularly market access driven and 
immobile.  
In contrast to other services firms, financial firms have a much greater sensitivity to taxation.  This is 
likely to be a reflection of the more footloose nature of these firms, given limited fixed assets 
relative to other sectors and less of a requirement to locate close to their market (particularly for 
more “back-office” type operations).  This could allow these firms greater freedom to choose lower 
tax locations than is the case for manufacturing and other services firms.   
As well as splitting the sample by strict economy sector, we use EC definitions for high-tech and low-
tech industries and recalculate the effects for these groupings (excluding the financial sector). We 
also split the skill categories by manufacturing and services to explore whether there is further 
heterogeneity beneath the broad aggregation.  Interesting we find that low-skill firms are more 
sensitive to tax rates and this result holds for firms in both the manufacturing and services sectors. It 
is unclear a-priori whether to expect low-tech or high-tech firms to be more or less sensitive to 
corporation tax. In line with our findings, high-tech firms may be more inclined to prioritise labour 
quality or the R&D environment with low-tech firms taking “off-the-shelf” capital structures to the 
lowest cost (in terms of operating costs and tax considerations) destination. However, it is not 
necessarily the case that this logic applies across both services and manufacturing firms.   
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Table 18: Coefficients –Extended Model – By Sector 
 
Policy rate Mean EATR Total Tax Rate Obs 
Manufacturing 
Coeff Tax -17.123*** -25.630*** -13.061*** 10,123 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.356*** 0.526*** 0.140*** 
 Services 
Coeff Tax -8.489*** -20.527*** -12.346*** 51,235 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.211*** 0.510*** 0.130*** 
 Financial sector 
Coeff Tax -36.832*** -70.170*** -18.188*** 16,339 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.327** 1.086*** 0.176*** 
 Other (Utilities and construction) 
Coeff Tax -13.177 -18.240 -19.896*** 4,527 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.276 0.352 0.226*** 
 High-tech non-financial 
Coeff Tax -4.562 -12.740** -13.647*** 22,791 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.078 0.275*** 0.136*** 
 Low-tech non-financial 
Coeff Tax -12.361*** -24.990*** -12.377*** 43,094 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.316*** 0.614*** 0.137*** 
 High-tech Manufacturing 
Coeff Tax -5.377 -17.878 -11.016*** 4,468 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.127 0.381* 0.112*** 
 Low-tech Manufacturing 
Coeff Tax -25.511*** -32.439*** -14.649*** 5,655 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.528*** 0.665*** 0.164*** 
 High-tech Services 
Coeff Tax -5.6 -13.637** -15.052*** 18,323 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.079 0.276** 0.149*** 
 Low-tech Services 
Coeff Tax -10.204*** -25.572*** -11.141*** 32,912 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.289*** 0.663*** 0.123*** 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 19: Marginal Effects - Main Model – By Sector 
 
Policy rate Mean EATR Total Tax Rate 
Split by Sector Type 
Manufacturing -0.63 -0.94 -0.48 
Services -0.31 -0.75 -0.45 
Financial sector -1.36 -2.58 -0.67 
Other (Utilities and construction)   -0.73 
Split by Sector Skill 
High-tech non-financial  -0.47 -0.50 
Low-tech non-financial -0.45 -0.91 -0.46 
Split by Sector Type & Skill 
High-tech Manufacturing  
 
-0.41 
Low-tech Manufacturing -0.93 -1.19 -0.54 
High-tech Services  -0.50 -0.55 
Low-tech Services -0.37 -0.93 -0.41 
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Firm size 
As discussed in the data section, the information on firm characteristics in their year of entry is more 
limited than our information on entry and reduces the sample size by approximately one-fifth.  
However, this still leaves a large enough number of firms to allow us to do an interesting comparison 
of the sensitivity to tax rates of different sized firms, which would be an important consideration for 
policy makers.  The firms are divided into three groups according to the assets of the newly 
established subsidiary (as discussed in the data section) and the location decision specification run 
separately for each group.  The results are shown in Table 20 with the associated marginal effects 
presented in Table 21. 
We find that across all of our measures of the tax rate there is an increase in the absolute value of 
the coefficients, showing that higher tax rates are regarded as a greater disincentive to choosing a 
location by larger firms.  In addition, the countervailing positive squared term does not change much 
across the firm size group. 
 
Table 20: Coefficient Estimates by Firm Size 
 
Policy rate Mean EATR Total Tax Rate 
Size 1 -  Small 
Coeff Tax 5.501 -20.149*** -11.449*** 
 
(5.985) (5.394) (1.754) 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.043 0.596*** 0.136*** 
 
(0.102) (0.100) (0.017) 
Size 2 - Medium 
Coeff Tax -13.807*** -28.864*** -14.001*** 
 
(4.897) (5.296) (1.782) 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.359*** 0.689*** 0.157*** 
 
(0.084) (0.098) (0.017) 
Size 3 - Large 
Coeff Tax -26.834*** -36.680*** -12.432*** 
 
(4.358) (5.329) (1.933) 
Coeff Tax Rate ^ 2 0.414*** 0.654*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.081) (0.100) (0.020) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Model estimated using all controls as in main extended model.  
 Table 21: Marginal Effects by Size 
 
Policy rate Mean EATR Total Tax Rate N 
Size 1 – Small 
 
-0.74 -0.42 24,056 
Size 2 – Medium -0.50 -1.06 -0.52 20,350 
Size 3 – Large  -0.99 -1.35 -0.46 21,714 
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5. Conclusions  
When companies internationalise their operations, they face many decisions. These include whether 
or not to export or to locate a plant abroad, where to locate an affiliate if FDI is the chosen method 
of globalisation, and then the volume of investment once the destination is chosen.   
This paper is narrowly focused on evaluating the role of corporation taxation on the location 
decision of foreign affiliates. It assumes that the firm has chosen FDI as its preferred 
internationalisation strategy and does not model investment flows. Our focus is therefore on 
identifying the degree to which corporation tax affects the location decision of foreign 
multinationals while controlling for a range of other important factors such as infrastructure, market 
potential, labour market cost and quality and geographic factors.  
A number of results emerge. We find a strong negative, but non-linear, effect of taxation on the 
likelihood of a destination being chosen. The result holds using a range of tax measures including the 
statutory policy rate, an estimated effective average tax rate, and a total tax rate. The findings are 
robust to the inclusion of a range of additional control variables and sub-sample splits.   
Splitting the sample by sector and by skill type, we find that the financial sector is the most sensitive 
to changes in the corporation tax rate, following by the manufacturing and services sectors. The 
utilities and construction sectors appear the least sensitive to corporation tax changes. Across both 
non-financial services and manufacturing, the location decisions of foreign affiliates in high-tech 
sectors are less sensitive to corporation taxation changes than firms in low-tech sectors. These 
heterogeneous impacts across industrial groupings are important to understand the impact of policy 
changes to corporation taxation across countries.  
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6. Annex 
Variable Sources and Definitions 
Variable Sources and Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
Location Dummy variable equal to 1 if subsidiary is located in a country and 0 otherwise  AMADEUS 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita WDI 
Market potential 
The sum of inverse distance-weighed real GDP of all regions other than the host 
region. Distance is measured as km between host and home country capital cities 
WDI, CEPII 
GDP growth Annual GDP growth, percent WDI 
Relative Labour 
cost 
Total compensation of employees divided by total number of persons employed AMECO 
Labour education Proportion of the labour force with a tertiary education, percent WDI 
Distance Distance is measured as km between host and home country capital cities 
 Agglomeration Lag of the stock of FDI as a percentage of GDP, percent WDI 
Infrastructure 
Surface area of paved motorways as a proportion of total land area in km squared, 
percent 
Eurostat, IRF 
Infrastructure 2 Fixed broadband Internet subscribers (per 100 people) WDI 
Common language Common official primary language CEPII 
Share border 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if home and host country share a border and 0 
otherwise  
CEPII 
Former colony 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if home and host ever shared a colonial relationship and 
0 otherwise  
CEPII 
Natural resources Total natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP, percent WDI 
EU 15 membership Dummy variable equal to 1 if host country is a member of EU15 and 0 otherwise - 
Relative Population Home country population divided by host country population WDI 
Relative GDP PC Home country GDP per capita divided by host country GDP per capita  WDI 
EU 15 membership Dummy variable equal to 1 if host country is a member of EU15 and 0 otherwise - 
Tax Variables 
Policy rate High-level policy rate KPMG, EY 
Mean EATR 
Griffith and Devereux (2003) methodology. This is a forward looking approach 
which calculates the reduction in the value of the profit stream for a model 
company as a result of the application of corporate income tax 
EU Commission  
EATR crossborder 
Similar to the above except in an international setting. This also takes into 
account corporate taxes and personal taxes levied on the shareholders by the 
home country government 
EU Commission  
Total tax rate 
"Total tax rate measures the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions 
payable by businesses after accounting for allowable deductions and exemptions 
as a share of commercial profits. Taxes withheld (such as personal income tax) or 
collected and remitted to tax authorities (such as value added taxes, sales taxes 
or goods and service taxes) are excluded"  
WDI 
  
 
